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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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This paper develops and tests a proposed methodology 
that puts forward a new integrated method for 
evaluating the performance of development finance 
institutions. This methodology applies assessment 
criteria that take into account both the social objective 
that the development finance institution addresses 
and the subsidies it received in order to achieve such 
an objective. This methodology is applied to two pilot 
case studies—Banadesa (Honduras) and Banrural 
(Guatemala). The authors calculate the previously tested 
subsidy dependence index, which measures the degree of 
an institution’s subsidy dependence. The paper develops 
and estimates a new measure—the output index— which 
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indicates the level to which the institution fulfills the 
social objectives of the state. The analysis integrates 
the subsidy dependence index and the output index 
to assess the effectiveness associated with meeting the 
social objective. The findings suggest that the integration 
of the two indexes can constitute the basis of a 
meaningful evaluation framework for the performance of 
development finance institutions. This new methodology 
can also be a useful metric for policy makers who are 
seeking to decide on an optimal allocation of scarce 
funds for development finance institutions that pursue 
social goals and for management that seeks improved 
performance outcomes. 
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During the 1960s and 1970s, development finance institutions (DFIs) proliferated around the 
world as financial intermediaries that aimed to improve social welfare. Those institutions
2 
had been established and financially supported by governments and donors. Their intent was 
to serve underprivileged segments of the population and economic sectors that had an unmet 
demand for credit, thus operating under the rationale that improving access to financial 
services is critical for economic growth. To the extent that DFIs act as the government’s 
means to promote its social objectives, they seek to serve those segments that—as a 
consequence of their location, risk, poor and volatile income, or information opacity (all of 
which are associated with substantial transaction costs and information asymmetry 
problems)—are typically not financially attractive to private banks.  
The reliance on DFIs to ensure that priority sectors and underprivileged clientele were 
provided with financial services, particularly credit, was the dominant practice in the 
development finance paradigm until the start of the 1990s. According to Yaron (2006), DFIs 
were considered essential to finance economically “warranted” operations that were not 
financially attractive to financial institutions (FIs) that are private and for-profit. 
In the 1990s, as a consequence of growing concerns regarding the DFIs’ poor performance 
(in terms of efficiency, profitability, and achievement of their social objectives) and as a 
result of the ensuing doubts regarding the justification for the DFIs’ mere existence, a wave 
of privatizations, liquidations, reduction of resources available to DFIs, and efforts to 
improve governance and supervision of the remaining DFIs
3 took place. Yet, in 2002, there 
were 80 DFIs in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), with Brazil having the largest 
number (11), followed by Argentina (9) (ALIDE 2002).
4  
As DFIs continue to have a substantial share of the financial sector assets in the region, it is 
very important to assess their performance. This assessment is relevant regardless of whether 
governments should be direct providers of financial services, which is a discussion beyond 
the scope of this paper, yet is briefly summarized herein. Therefore, policy makers and bank 
managers need assessment criteria and metrics that help them to establish performance 
indicators that guide both day-to-day management and broader strategic decisions.  
DFIs are financial institutions that benefit from (typically) concessionary financial resources 
and aim to improve social welfare. In this paper, we focus only on DFIs that have a large 
share of government ownership. However, irrespective of the ownership of the FI, the 
methodology offered can be used for institutions that benefit from concessionary financial 
                                                 
2 For the purposes of this paper, the focus is on DFIs with a substantial share of government ownership and that 
benefit from concessionary resources.  
3 However, the introduction of governance and supervision that are subject to private regulatory standards may 
force DFIs to deviate from their social mandate, thereby leading them to mimic private banks in their allocation 
criteria and to generate mission diversion. This has been called the Sisyphus syndrome, following De la Torre 
(2002).  
4 See Annex 1 for a summary of the key characteristics of DFIs in LAC. 
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resources to deliver financial products to a government’s chosen target clientele that would 
otherwise not have access to such services. 
The clients that the DFI serves (or claims to serve) are usually underprivileged clients, 
sectors, or regions. The concessionary financial resources that are usually made available to 
DFIs vary and include, among others, cheap borrowing, under-priced guarantees, exemption 
from reserve requirements and taxes, coverage by the government of partial or all operational 
costs, loan losses, and the transfer of funds to create a capital endowment. 
The paper does not cover government-owned commercial banks that neither serve nor claim 
to serve any underprivileged segment of the population or an economic “priority” sector (that 
is, government-owned banks that in their strategy and operations are indistinguishable from 
private banks, such as Banco Costa Rica). For this category of purely state-owned FIs, the 
subsidy dependence index (SDI) might be an adequate tool for evaluating their performance, 
particularly if their profitability—despite of their commercial orientation—is lower than the 
profitability of private, profit-maximizing banks that serve (or could serve) the same 
clientele, or if the profitability of state-owned FIs is lower than the opportunity cost of the 
government’s funds. However, using the output index (OI) for these commercial banks 
would not add any important relevant information because they lack a “social” mission. 
In most cases, public funds entrusted to DFIs are subsidized by definition. The unfettered 
market would have charged higher rates. If public funds were not subsidized, the DFI would 
refuse the funds and go to the market on its own. Likewise, a DFI subsidizes its clients, who 
would not demand DFI’s services if they were costlier than identical services from a for-
profit FI. Some exceptions exist. By law, certain DFIs have been recently prohibited from 
seeking funding directly in the financial markets and thus, must rely on public funds (for 
example, Finrural in Mexico). Clients may be required to use public banks to get another 
benefit (for example, farmers may be required to use a public agricultural bank to be eligible 
for technical assistance). In fact, particularly in rural areas, DFI financing could be the only 
option available.  
DFIs that serve social objectives or that claim to do so will usually differ substantially with 
respect to their cost structure, cost-effectiveness, clientele served, loan losses, and other 
important efficiency and profitability factors. However, all of them can benefit from 
introducing the OI and the SDI when evaluating and measuring their performance. According 
to the Inter-American Development Bank (1994), “Measurement forces DFIs and their 
sponsors to discuss their goals. Foggy goals wither under attempts at measurement. 
Buzzwords lose punch unless grounded in the nuts-and-bolts problems of measurement.” 
In response to the need for assessing DFI performance, a growing body of literature has 
emerged during the past two decades. However, most studies that aimed to evaluate DFIs’ 
performance have relied, for instance, on traditional accounting profitability measurements 
such as return on assets (ROA) or return on equity (ROE), which are not adequate to assess 
DFIs’ performance because they disregard DFIs that seek to maximize a social objective and 
that often benefit from large subsidies. The literature that has analyzed whether DFIs fulfill 
their social objectives consists mostly of cross-country analyses of aggregated data with a 
focus on macroeconomic variables. These analyses have the limitation of ignoring important 
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outcomes due to the heterogeneity across and within countries. Thus, they fail to evaluate 
whether DFIs or governments achieve their various and diversified social objectives.  
Figure 1 illustrates the futility of fully relying on traditional financial ratios when assessing 
the DFIs’ performance. The accounting profit of a DFI that benefits from subsidies is 
determined to a large degree by the value of the subsidies it gets, which does not enter 
accounting data. Hence, such “profit” is, for all practical purposes, the residual value of the 
subsidies received. The higher the subsidy administratively decided on, the higher the profit. 
Consequently, the evaluation of the DFI (deceitfully) indicates better performance than really 
exists. 
Figure 1. Effect on a DFI’s ROA and ROE Based of Changing the Interest Rate 








































Key Assumptions: Equity equals 10 percent of total assets. The average annual yield obtained on total assets is 20 percent, 
and administrative expenses are 6 percent of total assets. 
DFI = Development Financial Institutions; ROA = return on assets; ROE = return on equity 
 
The motivation behind the study is to test a methodology that is better suited to assess DFIs’ 
performance (a) by applying performance assessment criteria that take into account both the 
social objective and subsidies received and (b) by using bank-level data that are more 
amenable to producing metrics that can be used by policy makers and bank managers in day-
to-day operations. We apply this approach to two DFIs: Banadesa in Honduras and Banrural 
in Guatemala. Both are rural development banks with a large share of government ownership 
(although no longer a majority at Banrural). One DFI was found to be subsidy dependent and 
the other not only was subsidy independent, but also had a net profitability above normal 
returns (when all subsidies received were subtracted from the annual profit).  
The methodology, presented in the third section of this paper, consists of (a) calculating an 
SDI that was developed by Yaron (1992a), which measures DFIs’ level of “financial 
sustainability”; (b) introducing and estimating an OI, which measures the level to which the 
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social objective of the government is fulfilled by the DFI; and (c) integrating both indices to 
assess the related cost-effectiveness of the DFI with respect to the subsidies received and the 
achievement of social goals assigned to the DFI.  
On the basis of the case studies prepared, our main conclusion is that the SDI and the OI 
proved to be meaningful performance assessments of DFIs and can provide useful 
information even in poor data environments. The SDI can provide a measure of the financial 
costs to society of DFI activities and can be a quantifiable parameter that indicates the degree 
of subsidy dependence. The OI can help DFIs undertake a cost-effectiveness analysis of their 
activities by measuring the degree of fulfillment of their social objectives. In an appropriate 
data environment to which most DFIs currently aspire, these metrics can be used to assess 
performance at the business unit, product, or branch level. 
Obviously, the use of the OI and the SDI should be only the start of the performance analysis 
that is suitable for development banks; not the end. Banks should follow quantified findings 
of subsidy dependence by computing the SDI through analyzing the factors (components) 
that contribute to subsidy dependence, such as excessive loan losses, high transaction cost 
per unit of outstanding loan, and the like. It is necessary for benchmarks to be established for 
each of these factors. This analysis will be more meaningful when reference data of other 
DFIs and FIs that serve similar clientele become available to use as benchmarks. Similarly, 
development banks should follow an OI calculation by analyzing the obstacles to achieving 
the DFI’s objectives. Sensitivity analysis of reducing or increasing cost factors and their 
expected effect on the SDI and the OI should be considered as essential managerial tools.  
For policy makers at the government level and for donors, this approach provides answers to 
basic questions such as the following: “What are the revenue, costs, and subsidy per financial 
product rendered to different income groups’ borrowers?” Such basic information can 
contribute substantially to improving resource allocation and to optimizing the use of 
subsidies. Presently, the decision makers possess little knowledge of the outcomes regarding 
the overall performance of the DFI involved.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief literature review, the 
third section describes the methodology, the fourth section applies the methodology to the 
case studies, and the fifth section presents the conclusions. 
2. Literature Review 
Debate about State-Owned Banks  
The debate concerning the role of state-owned banks is framed along four main theories: 
development, social, agency, and political. Although the development and social views are 
supportive of state-owned banks, the political view argues against state ownership. The 
agency view falls between the social development and social views supporting state 
ownership of banks and the political view that is skeptical of state ownership.  
During the 1950s and 1960s, a number of development economists—most notably 
Gerschenkron (1962), Myrdal (1960), and Lewis (1955)—advocated government ownership 
of banks as part of a broader sentiment that defended public ownership of strategic economic 
sectors. This stream of thought, often called the development view, stresses the need for 
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public intervention in economies where the scarcity of capital, public mistrust, and extensive 
fraudulent practices among debtors would discourage long-term credit, thus affecting the 
economic growth prospective. This dominant thinking brought about a proliferation of DFIs 
around the world, including LAC, with various purposes such as  ensuring a credit supply to 
priority sectors as part of a broader industrial development strategy, or as in the case of rural 
banks, promoting food self-sufficiency arguments. 
More recently, the social view—prominently defended by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)—
argues that the existence of market failures in the financial market justifies creating and 
supporting DFIs. According to this view, since an expansion of financial services supports 
economic growth, DFIs should be created to address prevailing market failures and reach 
underserved segments. The social view states that market failures occur because private 
banks maximize profit, thus having either low or no interest in offering services to low-
income individuals, remote communities (where it is not profitable to open branches), or 
more generally, in financing unprofitable projects with positive social externalities.  
Moreover, private banks may have low incentives to lend to small businesses that lack 
traditional collateral or are too risky, such as agriculture
5, because the costs of administering 
and monitoring those loans are high and because default rates are substantial.
6 Therefore, 
both the development and social views ultimately argued for an interventionist role of the 
state in the financial sector. However, the role was intended to be temporary, which would be 
similar to the well-known “infant-industry” argument for intervention in other sectors.  
The lack of evidence that DFIs were effectively fulfilling their social objective supported the 
argument that banks were not necessarily different from other businesses and that the case for 
financial market imperfection was overstated. Thus, market failures could be better addressed 
with regulations and subsidies to for-profit private financial institutions that would serve the 
target clientele, rather than with direct state ownership of banks. This line of reasoning led to 
a paradigm shift toward a more laissez-faire stance, which argued for limiting or eliminating 
the role of the government in the direct provision of financial services. Instead, according to 
this new view, the state’s efforts should concentrate on developing an adequate enabling 
environment,
7 in which private financial institutions can thrive. This approach motivated a 
wave of privatizations, limitation of activities (primarily the shift from direct lending to 
beneficiaries to second tier banking), and liquidation of DFIs around the world. As a result, at 
least 250 financial institutions were privatized between 1987 and 2003.  
In this context, the political view argues that DFIs were not created to channel funds to 
unserved and socially desirable projects, but rather to pursue the individual goals of 
                                                 
5 Many public banks in Latin America focus on specific sectors, such as agriculture, at least in their design.  
6 Theoretically, public banks could have fewer principal-agent problems and lower transaction costs compared 
to private banks, because it might be easier for them to have access to information and to exploit economies of 
scale (Stiglitz 1994). In financial markets, when information is available, it is incomplete and subject to 
asymmetries between suppliers and users. Because of the “public good” nature of information, banks have 
difficulty appropriating returns from information; thus private banks have little incentive to incur transaction 
costs in acquiring information. 
7 The enabling environment includes enhancing creditor and shareholder rights, upgrading prudential regulation, 
modernizing accounting practices, and promoting more reliable systems of information on debtors (De la Torre 
2005). 
  6   
politicians (Shleifer and Vishny 1994; La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2002). A 
somewhat in-between argument is found in the agency view, which recognizes that DFIs can 
be important means to pursue the government’s social mandates. Such means can fulfill 
social policies through the selective allocation of credit (De la Torre 2005).
8 However, the 
agency view also considers that DFIs are prone to generate corruption and misallocation 
(Banerjee 1997) and that agency costs within government bureaucracies can result in weak 
managerial practices.  
Assessment of DFI Performance 
The need to assess DFIs’ role has led to an evaluation of their financial performance and of 
the fulfillment of their social objective. This need emerged because of a growing concern that 
the subsidies provided to DFIs were being misused, given the small amount of evidence that 
those institutions were serving their clientele as expected. Also, worrisome trends emerged 
regarding their financial performance, as evidenced by their mounting losses, poor loan 
recovery, and continued dependence on subsidies for operational purposes.   
Recent studies have corroborated that DFIs have not mitigated market failures but have 
actually led to inefficient allocation of resources. Furthermore, a number of studies found 
little evidence that state ownership of banks promotes economic growth (La Porta, López-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer 2002; Levy-Yeyati, Micco, and Panizza 2004) or financial depth (Barth 
et al. 2001) views argued by proponents of creating DFIs. 
In addition, distorting effects on the allocation of financial resources were found, for 
example, in Italy (Sapienza 2004) and in Brazil (Kumar and Francisco 2005).
9 Both studies 
show that public banks not only do not lend more to small firms than private banks do, but 
they actually favor large firms. Moreover, Galindo and Micco (2003) report that public banks 
do not differ from private banks regarding the provision of credit to firms lacking collateral. 
Other studies, however, point out some success stories such as the Village Bank system of 
Bank Rayat in Indonesia (Charitonenko, Benjamin, and Yaron 1998) or the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand (Townsend and Yaron 2001).
10 
Regarding the assessment of DFIs’ “accounting profitability” performance, most of the 
studies use standard indicators of bank profitability such as return on assets (ROA), return on 
equity (ROE), interest margins, and nonperforming loan ratios. DFIs are generally found to 
perform worse in terms of standard financial accounting ratios than private banks (Micco, 
                                                 
8 The description of the alternative views concerning the role of state-owned banks presented earlier is broadly 
in line with De la Torre (2005), which categorizes the government’s role in reducing the problem of access (that 
is, unmet demand, rather than lack of use of financial services) into three views: (a) the traditional bi-polar 
stance, (b) the interventionist, and (c) the laissez-faire, plus a more recent pro-market view, which favors direct 
government interventions in nontraditional and market friendly ways.  
9An illustration of this phenomenon can be found in Brazil’s political economy, which years ago, during a 
period of hyperinflation, introduced of a two-month CPI indexation waiver for agricultural loans. In light of the 
hyperinflation, this measure drastically reduced the real value of the country’s agricultural outstanding loan 
portfolio by one-third. However, the amount of credit extended and the subsidy involved were highly correlated 
to the size of land ownership. Thus, in Brazil, where 1 percent of the farming households own about one-half of 
the arable land, the main beneficiaries of such a regressive income distribution measure were obviously large-
scale farmers, including the “urban cowboys.” 
10 Their success may derive from their lending technology and from following best practices in microfinance. 
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Panizza, and Yañez 2004 and Messouri 1999, among others). It is unclear whether DFIs’ 
worse performance stems, at least partially, from the fact that they primarily serve social 
objectives (which are difficult to quantify), rather than maximize profits—in which case 
financial performance is bound to suffer. Alternate explanations for DFIs’ poor performance 
could be that they face lower incentives or indeed have poor governance structure and weak 
management.  
As a consequence, the evaluation of DFIs’ performance cannot rely on traditional measures. 
Traditional approaches are suitable for commercial banking but fail to capture explicit costs 
and benefits associated with DFIs’ operations, such as the subsidies that are embedded in 
most DFIs’ “products” or the fulfillment of social welfare objectives. Seeking to overcome 
these limitations, Yaron (1992a)
11 developed a performance evaluation framework that uses 
as its primary assessment criteria the “self–sustainability” of DFIs measured through the SDI. 
This framework was introduced in the early 1990s for assessing the performance of rural 
banks, microfinance institutions, and others. It has gained wide acceptance among 
practitioners and academics. Apart from improvements in the effectiveness of those types of 
measures, a need remains for developing a methodology to assess the extent to which DFIs 
(a) are reaching their social goals or (b) are effectively using their subsidies to achieve those 
goals. As stated earlier, these two aspects are the main subject of this paper and are explored 
in the next sections.  
3. Methodology 
Our methodology consists of applying the already-tested SDI, developing and implementing 
the OI, and integrating both the SDI and OI concepts. This methodology is tested on two case 
studies: Banadesa in Honduras and Banrural in Guatemala. These two DFIs lie at opposite 
ends of the spectrum in terms of operational and institutional strength, and they were chosen 
deliberately to show the usefulness of the methodology by illustrating its effectiveness in 
institutions with substantial differences in levels of cost-effectiveness. 
The SDI reveals the increase in annual yield on the DFI’s loan portfolio that would be 
necessary if full subsidy independence is to be reached. Specifically, the SDI quantifies the 
total explicit and implicit subsidies to a DFI, thereby allowing cost comparisons with other 
social programs. This indicator can be used to track subsidy dependence over time. Thus, it 
can be used as a planning and monitoring tool, as well as to compare the subsidy dependence 
of different DFIs, in the same or different countries that serve similar clientele. 
The OI is custom-designed depending on the policy objective that the DFI may have (for 
example, lend to the rural poor, or support fledging micro-enterprises). The OI requires 
choosing explicitly quantifiable output variables that are related to the subsidized 
intervention and agreement on the relative weights of each variable. The main advantage of 
the OI is that it provides policy makers with a metric that addresses their prioritized social 
objectives, especially for reaching the target customer base of the DFI. The specific 
parameters of this metric can be adjusted depending on the particular objective a DFI may 
                                                 
11 There are other tools to measure the subsidy dependence such as the financial self-sustainability (FSS) that 
was developed later. The transformation from the SDI to the FSS and vice versa is simple.  
  8   
pursue (for example, outreach to the poor, women, rural nonagricultural activities, growth in 
lending in a post conflict region, etc.).  
The integration of the SDI and OI concepts assists in evaluating the cost of providing 
subsidies to DFIs with the benefit of achieving their social objectives (for example, lending 
to low-income borrowers), thus more effectively measuring the social benefits of the 
subsidy.
12 
Computation of the SDI  
The amount of the annual subsidy received by a DFI is defined as 
S = A (m – c) + [(E * m)  P] + K  
where  
S   =  Annual subsidy received by the DFI 
A   =  DFI concessionary borrowed funds outstanding (annual average) 
m   =  Social opportunity costs, or the interest rate that the DFI would be assumed 
to pay for borrowed funds without access to borrowed concessionary funds  
C   =  Interest rate on DFI’s average annual (concessionary) borrowed funds 
outstanding 
E   =  Average annual equity 
P   =  Reported annual profit before tax (adjusted, when necessary, for loan loss 
provisions, inflation, and so on) 
K   =  The sum of all other annual subsidies received by the (DFI)—such as 





                                                 
12 Achieving DFIs’ social objective through subsidies makes the subsidy more socially desirable or less costly 
to society (for example, serving more poor clients, or a subsidy per unit of OLP, issued to poor farmers is more 
valuable to society than the same subsidy per $ OLP to rich farmers). 
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S 
SDI = ------------------ 
LP * i 
 
where  
SDI  =  Index of subsidy dependence of DFI 
S   =  Annual subsidy received by the DFI (see above) 
LP   =  Average annual outstanding loan portfolio of the DFI 
I =  Average yield earned on the loan portfolio of the DFI. 
 
Conventional accounting measures the cost of funds that are priced at their accounting value. 
The ROE and ROA reflect the volume of subsidies that were injected into the DFI through 
concessionary borrowed funds. Thus, they do not necessary present the DFI’s true financial 
performance. The opportunity cost of a DFI’s borrowed funds (that is, the cost that the DFI 
would have to pay for its funds if access to concessionary funds were eliminated) is not taken 
into account. The SDI calculation assumes that the volume of the DFI’s OLP remains 
unchanged. Hence, the change is caused by substituting voluntary savings for concessionary 
borrowed funds (or other accessible borrowing sources) at a market-related interest rate. 
 
The SDI illustrates the percentage of increase that is needed in the annual yield on the OLP 
as a percentage of the current yield achieved, if full subsidy independence were to be reached 
instantly.
13 This illustration assumes, for simplicity, that an increase in the lending interest 
rate would generate the subsidy elimination. However, it is clear that any type of cost saving 
would automatically be reflected as an increase in annual profit (or as a reduction in annual 
loss). Therefore, that cost saving would inevitably lower the SDI. Figure 2 summarizes the 






                                                 
13 This complete SDI ratio also provides the notion of a matching grant, when the numerator is the grant 
received from society and when the denominator is the value of interest and fees paid by the ultimate clients for 
the financial services they benefit from. 
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Figure 2. Effects of Different Parameters on the SDI 
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An SDI of zero means that a DFI has achieved full self-sustainability. An SDI of 100 percent 
indicates technically, for simplicity,
14 that a doubling of the average lending interest rate is 
required if subsidies are to be eliminated. A negative SDI indicates not only that a DFI has 
fully achieved self-sustainability, but also that its annual profits—minus its capital (equity) 
that was charged at the approximate market interest rate—exceeded the total annual value of 
subsidies. Thus, subsidies could be effectively reduced or eliminated or services could be 
provided at lower costs for clients (as found with respect to Banrural). 
The SDI-based analysis can be refined further, particularly by analyzing the drivers of the 
profit (P) term in its calculation. Two drivers of particular interest in microfinance 
institutions and DFI are net loan losses and transactions costs. Successful institutions of this 
type keep annual loan losses in the range of 2–5 percent of average annual OLP. However, 
this success is in many cases achieved by using specialized lending technologies that lead to 
transaction costs that are significantly above those of regular commercial banks.  
In many microfinance institutions, the value of the transaction cost measured against the OLP 
exceeds 30 percent and reaches a somewhat lower figure when measured against total 
assets.
15 Future work requires going beyond merely computing the SDI— to measuring the 
                                                 
14 The SDI is a rough indicator. It ignores a situation where a substantial increase, for example 100 percent, in 
the lending rate is also likely to result in increased loan losses. Therefore, it would require either a higher 
percentage interest rate hike to eliminate subsidies or no increase in the lending rate, which could lead to the 
elimination of the subsidies because of their adverse effect on loan collection. 
15 See the MicroBanking Bulletin, July 2005.  
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extent that loan losses, transaction costs, or both are above the “good” standards that 
characterize lending to the specific target clientele, and to computing the effect of potential 
change in the cost or revenue of conspicuous components that determine the SDI. 
The SDI can be computed for any period—a month or a decade (to overcome business cycle 
issues). However, practical experience shows that an annual analysis that conforms to the 
periods for which the budget and the audited financial statements are prepared is an 
instrumental practice. Consistency in the underlying assumptions from period to period is 
more important than the absolute accuracy of the figures included in the SDI computation. 
The SDI is a ratio that measures the percentage of increase in the average lending interest 
rate required to compensate a DFI for the elimination of subsidies in a given year, while 
keeping its ROE equal to the approximate nonconcessionary borrowing cost.  
 
The SDI by itself does not clarify how the subsidy was used or whether most benefits were 
accrued to the target clientele or consumed by an inefficient bureaucracy. The advantage of 
the SDI is its simplicity as it focuses exclusively on the intake of the subsidy. The SDI should 
be seen in some instances as a lower limit because full financing of DFI activities is likely to 
be difficult at current market borrowing rates, especially if their financial performance is 
dismal. However, calculating this lower limit is vital for ascertaining either the DFI’s 
progress toward self-sustainability or the social desirability of its continued subsidy 
dependence.  
 
The analysis that starts with the computation of the SDI should not be pressured to raise 
lending rates just because the SDI computation indicates a technically needed change in the 
lending rate that will fully eliminate the subsidy dependence. On the contrary, there should 
be a focus on cost saving and adequate loan collection, and comparisons with related data of 
world performance leading DFIs that serve similar clientele should be included in the 
analysis.  
 
The quality of the accounting data clearly affects the capacity to generate an accurate SDI. 
However, even when the accounting data are not fully reliable, computing the lower bound of 
the SDI is always possible by applying simple, straightforward working assumptions. When 
consistently applied, the SDI computation could be instrumental in evaluating the 
performance of the DFI, as well as in focusing on the need to further improve the accounting 
system and procedures to comply with GAAP and international auditing standards. 
 In particular, the issue of the adequacy of the provisions and reserves for loan losses requires 
special attention, and the scope of internal and external auditing should aim at coping with 
that challenge. Sensitivity analyses related to estimating increase in annual provisioning for 
loan losses could be instrumental when doubts arise about the working assumptions that 
determine the adequacy of such provisioning. 
Although removal of subsidies received by a DFI is not always politically feasible or 
economically desirable, measurement of any subsidy is always warranted, economically and 
politically, because it could lead to a better resource allocation. Computing the subsidy 
dependence of DFIs would contribute to essential disclosure of basic data that are imperative 
to enlighten the public debate about use of scarce public funds. Without an SDI indicator, the 
public would continued to be fed with information that is confined to partial DFI 
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performance indicators such as “profit”—much of which is the residual value of the subsidy 
received, the amount disbursed, or the value of the OLP and the amount associated with bail-
outs whenever they occur. The public would thereby fail to understand the full picture of the 
social costs associated with maintaining the subsidized DFI.  
 
Computation of the OI When Based on Income Groups  
When one measures the outreach by loans extended to different income size groups (Li), the 
loan-receiving population is divided into n distinct groups, where a lower i represents lower 
income (for example low, medium, and high are represented by i = 1 to 3, respectively). It is 
assumed that the government’s social objective assigns a higher social value to lending to the 
lower income group, as an approach that will foster development and alleviate poverty.  
The weights attached to the income groups are expressed by αi, where ∑ . Thus, if the 








αi > αi+1. 
If αi = αi + 1, then there is a situation of indifference, where lending to either high- or low-
income individuals delivers the same utility. 



















If the government has no preference for lending to a certain group, the weights stand equal 
across groups, thus the nonweighted output index (OI





























< 1: Government lends comparatively more to lower income groups  
= 1: Government lends comparatively the same across income groups   If Z  {
  > 1: Government lends comparatively less to lower income groups 
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Therefore, the weighted cost of subsidy is Cw = Z*C, where C is the actual cost of subsidy. 
When Cw < C, the society benefits from an enhanced social gain because of the greater 
allocation of subsidies to the lower income groups. Alternatively, the net cost of the subsidy 
to the society is lower. When Cw > C, the actual subsidy is higher and the net cost to society 
is higher. Thus, less lending reached the target segment of the population. 
Although the OI can be used primarily for outreach measurement, it can also be adapted to 
other needs that reflect the government’s utility function (for example, if the goal is to target 
women, the portfolio could be divided by gender). Alternatively, the parameter L could be 
substituted for a different indicator that is not related to volume, such as the average spread 
of loan groups. 
Applicability of SDI and OI to Different Types of DFIs 
The SDI and the OI can be used to assess the performance of different types of DFIs with a 
social objective.
16 Annex 2 presents a typology of DFIs that can be assessed while using such 
metrics. The typology is arranged along two axes:  
1.  Service mechanism: It refers to whether the DFI provides services directly to final 
beneficiaries or acts as a second-tier institution. Additional care is needed when 
calculating the subsidy of a second-tier DFI to avoid either double counting of 
subsidies that in reality accrue only to the retail bank that the DFI serves or 
underestimating subsidies provided through such a bank. 
2.  Product focus: It refers to whether the institution concentrates on lending activities. 
Although the earlier discussion uses mostly lending examples, in practice the SDI 
may illustrate the additional amount that a DFI would need to charge for any of its 
nonlending services in order to make the subsidy necessary. 
 
4. Two Pilot Case Studies 
Banadesa 
Background and Setting 
Banadesa is the Honduran state agricultural development bank. It has approximately US$50 
millions in assets (about 1 percent of the total assets in the Honduran financial system), 
representing one of the smallest DFIs in the region. It is among the smallest 5 in a set of 80 
DFIs identified in LAC.
17  
Banadesa’s performance reflects the characteristics of the old school of agricultural credit 
that reigned over development theories until the end of the 1980s. Those characteristics 
include (a) narrowly directed credit to agricultural producers—rather than to all other rural 
income–generating activities and rural consumption, (b) political intervention with respect to 
credit allocation and its terms, (c) poor financial discipline that eventually resulted in low 
loan recovery, (d) lack of comprehensive knowledge regarding the overall social cost of 
                                                 
16 As already mentioned, this paper does not consider publicly owned commercial banks that do not have a 
stated social objective because it would be meaningless to calculate the OI for those institutions. 
17 The 2001 data were the latest available as of end-2004. The main sources were the websites of Alide and the 
Central Bank/Superintendency. The table includes only the first tier or mixed (first and second tier) DFIs, but 
data are available for second tier DFIs as well. 
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maintaining the DFI, and (e) lack of a clear internal view of its products’ cost and revenue 
structure.  
Defining Banadesa’s Business Lines 
Banadesa finances all agricultural activities, focusing on small and medium producers, 
although the bank reports plans to diversify toward any rural income–generating activities. 
The key activities financed include the growing of grains, coffee, sugar cane, cotton, and 
fruits, a few agro-industrial and rural services activities, as well as cattle raising.   
A recent innovation of Banadesa has been the Monedero Agrícola credit card, a particular 
form of credit disbursement that is subject to higher costs but that permits greater control 
over the ultimate use of funds. The agricultural producers are issued a card, a voucher, and a 
savings account, which is opened on their name. The producers can use the card only when 
dealing with specified input-selling companies and only for the goods listed on the voucher. 
The company then charges Banadesa directly for the purchase of such inputs.  
Since there is a lack of detailed data regarding the revenue, cost, and profit margin for each 
business line, the breakdown of loans (total amount and number) by loan size—as well as by 
sectors—is not available. Therefore, we used loan sizes (as a proxy for clientele served) to 
define Banadesa’s products for the purpose of the analysis. 
Banadesa’s SDI 
Banadesa has deficient financial reporting systems that lead to inaccurate financial 
statements, for which the external auditor (WB?) identified and recommended many 
substantial needed adjustments. A crucial data constraint faced when computing the SDI was 
the need for the consolidation of Banadesa’s Own Funds (Fondos Propios) and Trust Funds 
(Fideicomisos). Banadesa’s Trust Funds are not audited, although they account for about 
one-third of Banadesa’s consolidated loan portfolio.  
Annex 3 summarizes the main deficiencies of Banadesa’s accounting system and its 
management information system (MIS), as well as the adjustments that the mission 
recommended Banadesa should carry out in order to calculate the SDI, OI, and related 
metrics.  
Calculating the opportunity cost to society of public funds used. The most important 
parameter in measuring the subsidy is the opportunity cost to society of public funds 
compared with the actual accounting cost paid by Banadesa for the concessionary funds. The 
subsidy is the social opportunity cost that Banadesa would have to pay in the absence of 
subsidies, minus the price it actually pays for the concessionary funds. 
 
The proxy used for the opportunity cost of funds was based on the interest rate on deposits, 
as is the case for most examples of the SDI.
18 The opportunity cost is then estimated as the 
                                                 
18 Another approach examined is applying the interest rate on bonds issued with a much higher yield by Fondo 
Nacional para la Producción y la Vivienda (FONAPROVI), which is a state-owned financial institution of the 
government of Honduras. This approach could more precisely reflect the marginal cost of funds that the state of 
Honduras faced.Using this method would have substantially increased the computed SDI.  
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rate paid for time deposits, plus a markup for the estimated cost of mobilizing and servicing 
such deposits, as well as the cost of holding the related reserve requirement. 
For Banadesa, the social opportunity cost of public debt was estimated at about 14 percent 
nominal, or 6 percent real, in 2002, and at 12 percent nominal, or 5 percent real, in 2003 
(percentages are based on data provided by the Banco Central de Honduras). 
Calculating the subsidies and the delivery cost of Banadesa’s products.  The SDI is 
calculated for 2002, the latest year for which data for both Fondos Propios and Fideicomiso 
were available.
19 As shown in table 1, the SDI was calculated for (a) Banadesa’s Fondos 
Propios, on the basis of financial statements audited by external auditors, and (b) 
consolidation of those audited statements reports for Fondos Propios and Banadesa’s 
unaudited, self-reported Fideicomiso statements.
20 Table 1 also presents the SDI that results 
from incorporating an (arbitrary) increase in provisions for loan losses of 7 percent,
21 a figure 
that accounts for the fact that loan losses provisions are underestimated (this adjustment 
serves in computing the lower limit of the SDI). Obviously, the real value of such 
provisioning requires a thorough audit work, which is out of the scope of this study. These 
results are also reported for both Fondos Propios and Consolidated. 
Table 1. SDI Calculation (2002) 
(Figures in Millions of Lempiras, Unless Otherwise Noted) 
















LP  Average loan portfolio  153  153  378   378 
LP*I  Revenue from loans   70  70  99   99 
I  Yield on lending   46%  46%  26%  26% 
P Profits  (losses)  (18)  (26)  3  (5) 
E  Average equity  (111)  (111)  209   209 
M  Social opportunity cost  14 %  14%  14%  14% 
A 
Average debt to 
government (IDB-linked) 
54 54  74  74 
A*C 
Interest expenses on debt 
to government 
1.5 1.5  2.5  2.5 
C 
Rate paid for debt to 
government 
3% 3%  3%  3% 
A*(M
-C) 
Discount on debt to 
government  
6 6  8  8 
E*M  Subsidy on equity  (16) (16)  29  29 
                                                 
19 The calculation of SDI takes into account the data limitations noted, including Banadesa’s deficient financial 
statements; the existence of three different sets of accounts (from Banadesa, the external auditor, and CNBS); 
and the unavailability, at this stage, of audited financial statements for 2003.  
20 Seeking to obtain the most realistic consolidated accounts possible, the consolidation added additional 
accounts to the audited Fondos Propios statements (which are likely “contaminated” because they do not 
distinguish between sources of funding for Fondos Propios or Fideicomiso). 
21 Table 1 illustrates how an adjustment in loss provisions (however small) would be reflected in the SDI. 
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S  = {A*(M-C) + [(E*M) – 
P] + K} 
8 16  34  42 
SDI =  S/(LP*I)  11%  23%  34%  42% 
  I* (1 + SDI) =  51%  57%  35%  37% 
1 Includes adjustment of 7 percent increase in annual loan loss provision.  
 
The calculated SDI for Fondos Propios of 11 percent indicates that Banadesa would have to 
increase the yield it obtains on its OLP from Fondos Propios by that degree (that is, from 46 
percent to 51 percent) to become subsidy independent. After incorporating (illustrative) 
adjustments on loan loss provisions (see table 1, second column), the adjusted SDI increases 
to 23 percent (that is, Banadesa would have to increase the yield on the OLP, from 46 percent 
to 57 percent).  
 
For the consolidated accounts, the SDI increases to 34 percent (see table 1, column 3), or an 
increase in the yield to about 35 percent (thus, reflecting that the Fideicomiso OLP benefits 
from much higher subsidies mainly because it charges lower lending interest rates when 
compared to those paid on the OLP of Banadesa’s own resources). The final column reports 
an increase in the yield to 37  percent for Banadesa (consolidated) to become subsidy 
independent, after incorporating (illustrative) adjustments on loan loss provisions.  
The above computations also provide essential sensitivity analysis, thereby indicating that the 
7 percent increase in the annual provisioning for loan losses would require a higher increase 
in the yield obtained on the OLP—if subsidies are eliminated overnight
22—from 35 percent 
to 37 percent. Such sensitivity analysis can be easily prepared for all other salient factors that 
affect the profitability of the DFI, such as the administrative cost measured against the value 
of OLP, the increase in OLP value per employee, and the like.  
Likewise, in 2002, reducing the administrative cost by 1 percent—or about Lempiras 9 
million—would have altered the SDI downward by about 8 percentage points, to 34 percent 
instead of 42 percent. The decrease in SDI would have required raising the yield obtained on 
the OLP from 26 percent to 35 percent instead of 37 percent.  
However, it is important to recall that changes in several accounting variables will not affect 
the SDI because of implicit assumptions in the computations of the SDI. A change in the 
variables would not affect the SDI because shadow prices were already assigned to those 
variables during the SDI computations. As an example, an increase (decrease) in the 
borrowing interest rate or any change in the financial leverage of the SDI (namely the ratio of 
equity to liabilities) will have no effect on the SDI. 
According to these calculations, Banadesa’s total cost of maintaining a lending portfolio can 
be decomposed into the portion covered by society (subsidy component), borrowers (yield on 
OPL), and others (Banadesa’s profits and net interest from other earning assets—for 
example, investments that constitute an integral part of liquidity management).  
                                                 
22 Assuming no effect on loan collection caused by the increase in the lending rate. 
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Table 2 indicates that the average annual cost of servicing the OLP for Banadesa 
consolidated, including the adjustments in loan losses (see column 4), is 44 percent. That is, 
it costs 44 cents per annum to service 1 Lempira of OLP of which (a) 11 cents is a subsidy 
contributed by society, (b) 26 cents was paid by the borrowers, and (c) 7 cents was obtained 
by Banadesa in the form of a return on other assets. These data present information that is 
much more instrumental and revealing than the usual reports on ROE and ROA.  
 
Table 2. Annual Average Outstanding Loan Portfolio (AAOLP)—Decomposition by 
Society, Borrowers, and Banadesa (2002) 






Cost of maintaining average annual OLP 
2  77%  87% 40% 44% 
     Average annual yield   (46% 
Not 
clear 
46%                  26%  26% 
     Subsidy  5%  10%  9%  11% 
     Profits + net returns on other earning assets  26%  31%  5%  7% 
Memo item (complement to data in Table 1):       
Annual cost of loans (L millions)  118  134  152  167 
Net revenue from other earning assets  22  21  21  21 
1 Includes adjustments to loan loss provisions that were increased by 7 percent. 
2 Due to a lack of detailed data, the portion of financial costs assigned to loans was based on volume. A share of 
about 90 percent of the total cost was assigned to OLP. Of the administrative costs, 95 percent were assigned to 
OLP and the full value of the subsidies was allocated to OLP. 
OLP = outstanding loan portfolio. 
For Banadesa, the large size of the estimates suggests that to solve the subsidy dependence 
Banadesa will have to go beyond increasing yields on its OLP. This would require an effort 
to reduce both operating costs and loan losses (for example, through better loan collection). 
These changes, however, constitute a demanding challenge because of (a) limited political or 
social prospects for increasing the yield, which is already perceived as high (in spite of risks), 
(b) prevailing sizeable operating costs and a lack of performance-based incentives to staff 
members and clients (c) uncertainty about the likelihood of related loan collection, and (d) 
realization of interest income if the lending rates increased substantially.
23  
The proposed methodology is instrumental in generating public awareness of this situation, 
ensuring that the social desirability of continuing subsidizing Banadesa is publicly debated, 
and, in enhancing awareness of the underlying causes for the size and nature of loan losses. 
Further research is needed to differentiate according to borrowers’ segments, identify the 
cause of poor collection, and potential solutions that aim to reduce the subsidy dependence 
over time and improve the servicing of small-scale rural clients.  
 
 
                                                 
23 The ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total loans is high, at least above 30 percent. This poor financial 
discipline is caused, among other reasons, by the very limited risk analysis capabilities of Banadesa’s staff 
members and by the moral hazard emerging from repeated bailouts of debtors in the past. 
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Banadesa’s Output Index 
Given the data limitations in defining specific lines of business and in adequately allocating 
related costs and subsidies, the study measures the extent to which Banadesa meets broader 
social objectives, such as lending more to the poor rather than lending to specific subsectors 
of agriculture (for example, livestock) that do not necessarily correlate with low (or high) 
income borrowers groups. According to data provided for Fondos Propios in 2003, loan size 
is taken as a proxy for the borrowers’ income. Thus, assuming that loan size and borrower’s 
income are highly correlated smaller loans are being extended to poorer clients.  
Assigning weights according to income group categories. The underlying assumption is that 
the government’s social objective function is to maximize lending to lower-income groups. 
Therefore, the government implicitly sets priorities and assigns a relatively larger weight to a 
lempira that is extended to lower-income groups than to a lempira that is lent to higher-
income groups. This larger weight results in a higher social return on the nominal subsidy 
granted.  
Income groups should be defined in order to differentiate between poorer and richer 
borrowers. As a first approximation, thresholds were set on the basis of monthly average 
amounts lent, which were loosely based on the poverty line for Honduras to define the 
lowest-income group.
24 The resulting three income groups are (a) the low-income group for 
loans below L2.5 million (US$125,000), (b) the medium-income group for loans between 
L2.5 million to L100 million (from US$125,000 to about US$5 million), and (c) the high-
income group for loans above L100 millions (US$5 million). Since the government assigns 
greater weights to lending to lower-income groups than to higher-income ones, the weights 
that follow are set accordingly, with the highest weight (0.5) for the lowest-income group.
25 
Those that pay the subsidy bill should explicitly determine priorities and should assign the 
corresponding weights to compose the OI. This decision should be taken by government 
officials, donors, chief executive officers, and DFIs’ boards of directors (See table 3). 
 
 
Table 3. The Monthly Average Amount Lent (Flows) during 2003 












< 2.5  826  1 Low 1 0.5
2.5–10 2,606  16
10–50 4,277  104 Medium 200 0.3
50–100 1,087  80
                                                 
24 The income of the lowest group is roughly equivalent to that of individuals who are below the poverty line. 
However, this approximation faces several weaknesses, including the lack of information related to 
demographic data (it was assumed that loans were extended to households; therefore, the process of defining the 
income groups was adjusted to reflect the loan size that corresponded to the poverty line per individual 
borrower). 
25 These weights are arbitrary. Weights may vary, but higher weights should be assigned to the lower-income 
groups, thereby reflecting a higher social desirability to financially serve lower-income groups rather than 
higher-income groups.  
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100–200 490  68
200–300 122  30
300–500 48  18 High 140 0.2
500–1,000 14  8
> 1,000   4  16
Total   9,474  341 33 4 1 1
 
Calculating the “discount factor” Z. The “discount factor” Z is the ratio of the nonweighted 
OI (OI
nw) to the weighted OI (OI
w).
 Although the OI
w takes into account the different weights 
across groups (larger for the lowest-income group), the OI
nw has equal weights across groups. 
Thus, OI
nw represents the case where the government is indifferent about lending to either 
low- or high-income groups. If Z is greater than one (that is, if OI
w is
 lower than OI
nw, which 
is the indifference point), then the DFI lends proportionally more to higher-income groups. If 
Z is below one, the DFI is lending proportionally more to low-income groups, which is in 
line with the government’s social objectives. Z serves as a discount factor for the subsidy 
because if Z is below one, the cost of each lempira given as a subsidy costs less because it 
reaches more of the target clientele. The calculations that are based on such assumptions are 
presented in table 4.  
 
Table 4. Calculating the “Discount Factor” Z 
OI
w  (1*0.5 + 200*0.3 + 140*0.2)/341 = 0.26 
OI
nw  1/n = 1/3 = 0.33 
Z  0.33/0.26 = 1.27 
  Source:  Authors’  calculations. 
According to this exercise and the numerical illustration, the OI
w stands at 0.26, for a 
corresponding “discount factor” Z of 1.27. Since the “discount factor” Z is greater than one, 
after adjusting for the government’s priorities, Banadesa (Fondos Propios) is lending 
comparatively less to low-income individuals than the amount desired by the government’s 
objective. If one uses the SDI methodology, the subsidy for Fondos Propios (after 
adjustments for loan losses) in 2003 is L16 million.  
If one takes this calculation (instead of the one reported in table 1, which is needed for 2003 
to match data available on loans), the effective cost of the subsidy is actually larger, at L20 
million (L16 million * Z of 1.27), because Banadesa’s allocation of loans to the various 
income groups was biased toward giving more service to the relatively higher-income 
groups. 
This analysis can be more detailed (for example, at the product level), but it would require 
more reliable and detailed information than most DFIs possess. It is essential to improve the 
financial reporting of DFIs so that their management and related governments are better 
informed about revenues received from clients with respect to interest earned, fees, costs, and 
the subsidies to the various products delivered to each income group. The cost of introducing 
the rudimentary cost accounting that is needed for this analysis is meager, while the benefits 
are substantial. 
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Banrural S.A.  
Background and Setting 
Banrural S.A. was formed in 1998 in Guatemala as a result of a transformation of its 
predecessor, Bandesa. Bandesa was a government-owned development bank founded in 
1970. Its objective was to promote and manage the government of Guatemala’s credit 
programs for the farming sector. The transformation of Bandesa was part of the 
modernization process of the Guatemalan financial sector. The claimed mission of Bandesa 
in Guatemala was similar to that of Banadesa in Honduras, namely to deliver agricultural 
credit. 
However, in contrast to most DFIs (including its predecessor), Banrural S.A. included in its 
mandate the goals of generating fair profitability while simultaneously adhering to its social 
goal, namely to promote the “integral development of the country ... with universal banking 
services and national covering, preferably directed toward farmers, merchants, artisans, and 
small- and medium-size entrepreneurs.” 
The process of transformation of Bandesa into Banrural S.A. was exceptionally successful, 
yielding remarkable achievements when the outcomes are evaluated against the 
characteristics and background of the environment surrounding the economy and the 
financial sector in Guatemala. The entry of private capital and cooperatives into Banrural’s 
capital base has by now made the government a minority shareholder. 
Banrural’s Business Lines 
Banrural offers lending products, including microfinance loans, agricultural loans, housing 
loans, consumer loans, infrastructure loans, and corporate loans. Table 5 shows the different 
products, the value of OLP of each product, and their share of total OLP as of end of FY 
2004.  








Consumer 63  1,502  47% 
Microfinance  19     466  14% 
Infrastructure  16     380  12% 
Agricultural  15     339  11% 
Housing  16     384  12% 
Corporate    5     140    4% 
Total          134  3,211  100% 
 
Banrural’s Subsidy Dependence Index  
Calculating the opportunity cost to society of public funds used. The opportunity cost of 
Banrural’s funds is estimated to equal the rate paid on time deposits, plus (a) a markup for 
the expected cost of servicing such deposits and (b) the cost of holding the related reserve 
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requirement. The opportunity cost is estimated at 6.51 percent nominal and –2.49 percent real 
in 2004, according to data from Banrural and Banco de Guatemala.  
 
Calculating the subsidies and the delivery cost of Banrural’s products. On the basis of the 
2004 audited financial statements, the SDI for Banrural was –11 percent. This figure 
indicates not only that Banrural has fully achieved self-sustainability, but also that its annual 
profit, minus its opportunity cost of own capital and subsidies received, exceeded the total 
annual value of subsidies.
26 The negative subsidy can be interpreted as a return above 
“normal” profitability that benefited the bank’s shareholders (society at large in proportion to 
the state ownership of Banrural).  
 
Banrural could have reduced its average lending rate from 17 percent to 15.2 percent, and 
still could have achieved adequate profitability as reflected by an SDI of zero (See table 6).  
Table 6. SDI Calculation, 2004 
(Figures in Millions Quetzals, Unless Otherwise Noted) 
 
   Fondos propios 
LP Average  OLP 2,517,950 
LP*I Revenue  from  loans  431,482 
I Yield  on  lending  17% 
P Profits  (losses) 113,934 
E Average  equity 101,905 










Interest expenses on 












E*M  Subsidy on equity  6,633 
S 
= {A*(M-C) + [(E*M) 
– P] + K} 
 
–49,495 
SDI =  S/(LP*I)  –1.47% 





















Examining the Composition of Banrural’s Cost of Lending. Banrural’s total cost of lending 
can be broken down into the portion financed by society (subsidy component), by borrowers 
(yield on OLP), and by Banrural itself (profits and net interest from other earning assets such 
as investments). As shown in table 7, the average cost of maintaining Banrural’s OLP is 24 
percent of the portfolio. That is, it costs 24 cents to maintain 1 Quetzal of OLP annually. Of 
these 24 cents, 72 percent is borne by the borrower, 36 percent is borne by Banrural’s return 
                                                 
26 In an environment of low interest rates, as was the case during the period analyzed, the opportunity cost is 
expected to be lower. Thus, it may also contribute to the negative SDI. 
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achieved on other yielding assets, and 8 percent reflects an economic gain to society beyond 
the opportunity cost of capital (in computing the SDI, the latter is considered as an economic 
cost).  
 
Table 7. Annual Average Outstanding Loan Portfolio (AAOLP)—Decomposition by 
Society, Borrowers, and Banrural, 2002 
Reported as percentage of AAOLP  Fondos propios 
Cost of annual servicing of OLP
1 24% 
     Interest and fees earned as a % of cost of annual service of OLP   72.2% 
     Subsidy as a % of cost of annual service of OLP  –8.3% 
     Profits + net returns on other earning assets as a % of cost of annual service of 
OLP 
36.1% 
Memo item (complement to data in table 6):    
Annual cost of loans (Q millions)  510,585 
Net revenue from other earning assets   329,316 
Note:  The portion of financial costs assigned to loans was based on the relative share of OLP from total assets, 
about 90 percent. Of administrative costs, 95 percent were assigned to lending operations (OLP) as well as the 
full value of subsidies. 
OLP = outstanding loan portfolio. 
Banrural’s Output Index 
Loan size is taken as a proxy for the borrowers’ income, assuming that both are highly 
correlated, so that smaller loans are assumed to benefit poorer clients. Box 1 provides details 
on Banrural’s OI and the number of beneficiaries. 
Box 1. The Output Index and the Number of Beneficiaries 
 
 
The OI must reflect the relevant target group that policy makers seek to support (for 
example, individuals, households, firms, municipalities, and so forth). In Banadesa’s 
analysis, because of a lack of data, it was assumed that each loan benefited a 
household composed of four individuals. However, in Banrural’s analysis, we made 
adjustments to the OI to reflect the fact that different types of loans benefit different 
borrowing groups.  
 
It was assumed that microfinance, agriculture, and housing loans benefit a household 
of five individuals and that consumer loans benefit one individual. The number of 
beneficiaries of different types of loans has been chosen arbitrarily for illustrative 
purposes, and only household survey data could provide a more reliable figure. For 
example, it is very likely that a consumer loan could actually benefit an entire 
household. 
  
In a DFI where a higher weight is assigned to smaller loans (that is, a proxy for loans 
to poorer people), increasing the number of beneficiaries per type of loan would reduce 
the OI in a manner similar to dividing the loan into smaller loans for each individual. 
This is done by adjusting the OI
w to scale it with respect to the reference unit, which is 
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the household. In our specific example, for consumer loans, the OI
w is multiplied by 
1/5 because the loan benefits one-fifth of a household. 
 
On the one hand, for other types of loans such as corporate or small and medium 
enterprises, the reference unit is the firm, which raises the issue of comparing OIs 
between loans that have different reference units—a complex issue. On the other hand, 
policy objectives are also different. Normally, DFIs have a set of products targeted to 
reach poorer individuals and a different set of products to reach small firms. Thus, the 
level of fulfillment of those objectives can be measured with different types of OIs. 
 
Allocating weights to lines of business according to income group categories. Income 
groups were defined roughly on the basis of the poverty line for Guatemala. It was assumed 
that low-income groups receive loans below Q20 thousand, (US$2,500), that middle-income 
groups are granted loans between Q20 thousand and Q100 thousand (US$2,500–US$12,500), 
and that high-income groups are granted loans above Q100 thousand (above US$12,500). A 
larger weight of 0.5 was assigned to lower-income groups, whereas weights of 0.3 and 0.2 
were assigned to middle- and high-income groups, respectively (see table 8). Table 9 outlines 
Banrural’s OLP in 2004 by product.  
 



















< 0.002  11  13       
0.002–-0.005 21  77  Low  815  0.5 
0.005–0.02 62  725       
.02–0.1 37  1,417  Middle  1,417  0.3 
0.1–1 2  474       
1,000–10,000 0.138  386  High  979  0.2 
> 10  0.007  119       
Total   133  3,211   3,211  1 
 
Table 9. Banrural’s Outstanding Loan Portfolio in 2004 by Product* 
(Values in Q Millions) 
Range of value   Microfinance  Agricultural  Housing  Consumer 
From  To  No. of loans  Value  No. of loans  Value No.  of  loans Value No.  of  loans Value 
0  0.002  2  3 0.3  0.5 0.3  0.4  8  9 
0.002  0.005  5  17 2  8 1  3  14  49 
0.005  0.02  11  123 8  97 5  69  38  435 
0.02 0.1  5 225  3 142  4 189  26 860 
0.1  1  1 100  0.3  85  1 119  1 107 
1  10  -  - 0.0  7 0.0  4 0.0  30 
10 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1 11 
  Total    23 466  13 339  11 384  86  1,502 
*Note: Two products are excluded from the table, which are infrastructure loans and corporate loans. 
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Calculating the “discount factor” Z. The “discount factor” Z differs among the different 
products for Banrural. For microfinance and agriculture lending, it was less than one, 
indicating that Banrural achieves its social development objectives by reaching low-income 
groups. For housing and consumer loans, Banrural’s discount factor was higher than one, 
indicating that it has not adequately channeled loans to the targeted low-income groups (see 
table 10). 
Table 10. Calculating the “Discount Factor” Z 
  Microfinance Agricultural  Housing Consumer  Total 
Summation of loan values 
 (Q millions)  466 339  384  1,502  3,211 
Weighted average summation of 
loan values (Q millions)  158 114  117  107  886 
OI
 w  0.34 0.34  0.31  0.07  0.28 
OI
 nw  0.33 0.33  0.33  0.33  0.33 
Z  0.98 0.99  1.09  4.68  1.94 
 
5. Conclusions and Potential Policy Implications 
Conclusions 
This paper has illustrated the usefulness of the SDI as a performance measurement parameter 
for public banks. The objective was to test and develop a methodology that is better suited to 
assess the performance of DFIs by applying performance assessment criteria that take into 
account both the social objective and the subsidies received.  
The SDI, which was originally developed for measuring the sustainability of DFIs, can and 
should be applied to measure the level of subsidy that a DFI is “consuming” for each 
financial product that is extended to a specific clientele (for example, low-income farmers). It 
could serve governments, enlighten donors and managements of DFIs that are seeking to 
lower or eliminate their subsidy dependence, or justify the continued benefit from well-
targeted and effectively delivered subsidies. In addition, the SDI provides policy makers with 
an explicit measurement of the costs incurred by the government in supporting the DFI, thus 
enabling a better comparison with other development interventions.  
The OI can be used to measure the level of achievement of the DFI’s social objectives. The 
newly developed OI is a flexible parameter that captures the level of DFI’s outreach with 
respect to the designated target group. Although in this paper the OI is used to measure 
outreach in terms of loans extended to various income groups, its ease of use allows its 
adaptation to other social policy objectives, such as lending to remote regions. A clear 
measure of outreach is essential, particularly because critics of DFIs claim that these 
institutions have been “captured” by special interest groups or that they have sought to 
address the same clients that commercial banks either serve or are ready to serve (if those 
banks had access to the same concessionary resources). 
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For example, agricultural DFIs are often criticized for concentrating on servicing high- 
income producers rather than small farmers. This tool allows unveiling the subsidy for each 
product that is reaching the specific target group. Currently, such information is rarely 
available. Thus, it is very difficult for decision makers to decide about how to use scarce 
resources, which segment of the target clientele will benefit from subsidies, and through 
which financial product.   
The amount of information provided by integrating the SDI and the OI is as good as the 
underlying accounting systems and management information systems (MISs) of the DFI. 
The SDI and the OI can be applied even under adverse or rudimentary data quality 
environments by setting the lower limit of the SDI.   However, availability of more granular 
information permits using the two parameters to measure performance at more disaggregated 
levels. In particular, better cost accounting systems could allow very detailed evaluating of 
the cost, revenue, and subsidy per product to a subset of clientele served (as was partially 
done for Banrural) or could allow applying the indices to evaluate branch-level performance. 
Potential Policy Implications  
The SDI components can inform policy decisions that seek to avoid distortions and 
unsustainable operations. Generally, governments should seek to have DFIs with SDIs close 
to zero. A large positive SDI typically reflects the need to enhance government intervention 
(for example, eliminate interest rate ceilings), while a negative SDI could imply that the 
government is potentially misplacing the subsidy (for example, the DFI, and hence the 
private sector may have achieved similar results without the subsidy). Thus, for DFIs with 
SDIs significantly different from zero, the government should review its policies (subsidies) 
and should adjust them as needed to achieve its objectives at the least cost to society, or it 
should consider if the DFIs are crowding out the private sector. To achieve that neutral SDI, 
the drivers illustrated in figure 2 can be used to decide what customer segments to serve and 
if the institution should move into customer segments that are more costly to serve and with 
higher credit risks.  
If subsidizing a DFI is a formal policy decision, the OI should be used to monitor its effect. If 
only the financial sustainability of the DFI is assessed, it is impossible to know how its 
operations should be adjusted to ensure that the social objective of the institutions is being 
fulfilled. The definition of output dimensions of the OI should be reviewed periodically 
because the objective of the DFI may change to ensure that efforts are being targeted in the 
right direction. 
Beyond the findings of this study, the next step would be the use of the SDI and the OI in a 
preliminary exercise of establishing performance benchmarks for DFIs. The two indices 
are very amenable to develop benchmarks for DFIs in the region. The development of these 
benchmarks would include reviewing and analyzing publicly available data (annual reports, 
mandates, target clientele served, and so forth) about DFIs in LAC to produce a database 
framework that would allow comparing performance of DFIs by relying on the 
methodologies of the SDI and the OI. 
  26   
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Aiello, F., D. Silipo, and F. Trivieri. 2001. “Ownership Structure, Behaviour, and 
Performance of the Banking Industry.” Dipartimento di Economia e Statistics, 
Università della Calabria, Cosenza, Italy. 
Altunbas, Y., L. Evans, and P. Molyneux. 2001. “Bank Ownership and Efficiency.” Journal 
of Money, Credit, and Banking 33(4): 926–54.  
Asociación Latinoamericana de Instituciones Financieras para el Desarollo (ALIDE). 2002.  
Atkinson, A., and J. Stiglitz. 1980. Lectures on Public Economics. London: McGraw-Hill.  
Banerjee, A. 1997. “A Theory of Misgovernance.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 
1289–332. 
Barth, James R. G Caprio Jr., R. Levine 2001. “Banking Systems Around the Globe: Do 
Regulation and Ownership Affect Performance and Stability?” in Mishkin, Frederic 
(ed.) Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn’t, National Bureau of 
Economic Research Conference Report, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.  
Beck, T., A. Demirgüç -Kunt, and R. Levine. 2004. “Finance, Inequality, and Poverty: Cross-
Country Evidence,” Policy Research Working Paper 3338, World Bank, Washington, 
DC. 
Beck, T., A. Demirgüç-Kunt, and V. Maksimovic. 2002. “Financial and Legal Constraints to 
Firm Growth: Does Size Matter?” Policy Research Working Paper 2784, World 
Bank, Washington, DC. 
Burgess, R., and R. Pande. 2004. “Do Rural Banks Matter? Evidence from the Indian Social 
Banking Experiment.” CEPR Discussion Paper 4211, Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, London.  
Caprio, G., and P. Honohan. 2001. Finance for Growth: Policy Choices in a Volatile World, 
World Bank Policy Research Report. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Caprio, G., and R. Levine. 2002. “Corporate Governance of Banks: Concepts and 
International Observation.” Global Corporate Governance Forum, Research Network 
Meeting, April 5, 2002. Mexico. 
Claessens, S. 2005. “Universal Access to Financial Services: A Review of the Issues and 
Public Policy Objectives.” Policy Research Working Paper 3589, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
De la Torre, A. 2002. “Reforming Development Banks: A Framework.” PowerPoint 
presentation given at the World Bank Staff Workshop on Reforming Public Sector 
Banks, December, Washington, DC. 
  27   
———. 2005. “Innovative Experiences in Access to Finance: Market Friendly Roles for the 
Invisible Hand.” Latin America Regional Studies Series, Concept Paper, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
De la Torre, A., and S. Schmukler. 2004. “Wither Latin American Capital Markets?” 
Regional Study, World Bank, Washington DC. 
Dinç, I. 2002. “Politicians and Banks—Political Influences on Government-Owned Banks in 
Emerging Countries.” Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Business School.  
Galindo, A., and A. Micco. 2003. “Do State-Owned Banks Promote Growth? Cross-Country 
Evidence for Manufacturing Industries.” Research Department Working Paper 483, 
Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC. 
Gerschenkron, A. 1962. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.  
Greenwald, B., and J. Stiglitz. 1986. “Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information 
and Incomplete Markets.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 101: 229–64. 
Inter-American Development Bank, 1995. “Technical Guide for the Analysis of 
Microenterprises Finance Institutions.” Working Paper Series, Washington DC. 
Jensen, M., and W. Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305–60.  
Kumar, A. 2005. Access to Financial Services in Brazil: A Study. Directions in Development 
Series. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 Kumar, A., and M. Francisco. 2005. “Enterprise Size, Financing Patterns, and Credit 
Constraints in Brazil: Analysis of Data from the Investment Climate Assessment 
Survey.” Working Paper Series 49, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
La Porta, R., F. López-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2002. “Government Ownership of 
Banks.” Journal of Finance 57: 265–301.  
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1999. “The Quality of 
Government.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15: 222–79. 
Levine, R. 1997. “Financial Development and Growth: Views and Agenda.” Journal of 
Economic Literature 35: 688–726. 
Levine, R., N. Loayza, and, T. Beck. 2000. “Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality 
and Causes.” Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (1): 31–77. 
Levy-Yeyati, E., A. Micco, and U. Panizza. 2004. “Should the Government Be in the 
Banking Business? The Role of State-Owned and Development Banks.” Research 
  28   
Department Working Paper 517, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, 
DC.  
Lewis, W. A. 1955. The Theory of Economic Growth. Homewood, Ill: Irwin.  
Meggison, W., and J. Netter. 2001. “From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on 
Privatization.” Journal of Economic Literature 39: 321–89. 
Micco, A., and U. Panizza. 2004. “Bank Ownership and Lending Behavior.” Research 
Department Working Paper 520, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, 
DC. 
———. 2005. “Public Banks in Latin America.” Background paper prepared for the 
conference titled Public Banks in Latin America: Myth and Reality. February 25, 
2005, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC.  
Micco, A., U. Panizza, and M. Yañez. 2004. “Bank Ownership and Performance.” Research 
Department Working Paper 518, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, 
DC. 
Myrdal, G. 1960. Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning and Its International 
Implications, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.  
Pagano, M., F. Panetta, and L. Zingales. 1998. “Why Do Companies Go Public? An 
Empirical Analysis.” Journal of Finance 53: 27–64. 
Rajan, R., and L. Zingales. 2001. “Financial Systems, Industrial Structure, and Growth.” 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 17(4): 467–82. 
———. 2003. “The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th 
Century.” Journal of Financial Economics 69: 5–50. 
Sapienza, P. 2002a. “Lending Incentives of State-Owned Banks.” Northwestern University, 
Evanston, IL, and Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.  
———. 2002b. “What Do State-Owned Firms Maximize? Evidence from the Italian Banks.” 
Discussion Paper 3168, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London. 
———. 2004. “The Effects of Government Ownership on Bank Lending.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 72: 357–84. 
Schreiner, M., and J. Yaron. 2001. Development Finance Institutions: Measuring Their 
Subsidy. Directions in Development Series. Washington, DC: World Bank.  
Shleifer, A. 1998. “State Versus Private Ownership.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 12: 
133–50. 
  29   
  30
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 1994. “Politicians and Firms.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
109: 995–1025. 
Stigler, G. 1967. “Imperfection in the Capital Market.” Journal of Political Economy 75: 
287–92.  
Stiglitz, J. 1994. “The Role of the State in Financial Markets.”  Proceedings of the World 
Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1993, pp. 19–52, World Bank, 
Washington DC.   
Stiglitz, J., and A. Weiss. 1981. “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.” 
American Economic Review 71(3): 393–410. 
Townsend, R., and J. Yaron. 2001. “The Credit Risk-Contingency System of an Asian 
Development Bank.” Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. 
Vogel, R., D. Adams, and J. Marthans. 1997. “Approaches to Rehabilitating Insolvent 
Government-Owned Banks.” Consulting Assistance on Economic Reform II, 
Discussion Paper 22, Harvard Institute for International Development, Cambridge.  
Yaron, J. 1992a, “Successful Rural Finance Institutions.” Discussion Paper 150, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
Yaron, J., B. McDonald, F. Charitonenko. 1998. “Promoting Efficient Rural Intermediation.” 
The World Bank Research Observer, 13: 147–70. 
———. 1992b. “Assessing Development Financial Institutions: A Public Interest Analysis.” 
Discussion Paper 174, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Yaron, J.2004. “State-Owned Development Financial Institutions (SDFIs): Background, 
Political Economy, and Performance Assessment.” IADB Conference on Public 
Banks, February 25, 2005, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC. 
 ———. 2006. “State-Owned Development Finance Institutions (SDFI): The Political 
Economy and Performance Assessment.” Savings and Development, 30(1): 39-78.   
Annex 1. Development Financial Institutions in Latin America (Data in US$ Millions) 
Operational Assets Loans Deposits Capital
Bank Name Country Modality 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005
Banco de Corrientes S.A. Argentina 1st Tier 745,301          492,621          67,846          92,414            483,951          382,874          35,572           33,915         
Banco de Inversion y Comercio Exterior Argentina 1st Tier 1,171,649       1,189,951       686,113        774,506          -                  -                  896,930         954,403       
Banco de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires Argentina 1st Tier 7,482,670       8,981,581       3,733,375     4,429,046       6,227,971       7,359,524       868,466         1,185,669    
Banco de la Nacion Argentina Argentina 1st Tier 44,750,968     50,097,826     8,427,017     10,405,641     30,137,136     33,322,245     4,773,207      5,060,147    
Banco de la Pampa Sociedad de Economia Argentina 1st Tier 1,211,911       1,405,859       318,892        416,173          960,238          1,106,532       136,220         174,193       
Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires Argentina 1st Tier 21,357,341     21,317,628     4,044,267     5,315,012       11,365,062     12,992,049     1,126,399      1,281,630    
banco de la Provincia de Cordoba Argentina 1st Tier 3,142,650       4,210,900       255,552        535,818          2,369,114       2,938,432       197,205         234,388       
Banco del Chubut S.A. Argentina 1st Tier 700,871          876,621          79,779          116,951          599,413          702,639          54,855           70,091         
Banco Municipal de Rosario Argentina 1st Tier 158,647          175,761          56,085          64,086            128,757          133,079          17,687           12,778         
Banco Provincia de Tierra del Fuego Argentina 1st Tier 287,026          407,819          90,415          157,553          244,915          309,269          22,445           44,180         
Banco Provincia del Neuquen Sociedad Anonima Argentina 1st Tier 967,038          975,456          294,334        366,371          696,239          749,207          68,842           100,360       
Nuevo Banco Bisel S.A. Argentina 1st Tier 1,746,793       1,842,701       639,037        756,750          910,594          1,172,443       81,329           132,922       
Nuevo Banco del Chaco S.A. Argentina 1st Tier 625,754          887,840          131,390        299,227          531,009          784,839          43,866           74,567         
National Financiera de Bolivia (NAFIBO, S.A.M.) Bolivia 2nd Tier 269.66            244.92            227.70          207.36            -                  -                  39.30            39.90           
Banco do Brasil (BB) Brazil 1st Tier 90,058            108,110          30,137          39,455            43,531            58,828            5,315            7,201           
Caixa Economica Federal (CEF) Brazil 1st and 2nd Tier 55,684            80,631            10,919          15,895            34,579            45,684            2,511            3,398           
Nossa Caixa Brazil 1st Tier 11,775            14,282            1,798            2,557              8,295              10,551            815               982              
Banco do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul (BANRISUL) Brazil 1st Tier 4,598              6,074              2,027            2,446              2,913              3,840              387               488              
Banco do Nordeste de Brasil (BNB) Brazil 1st Tier 4,961              5,381              1,465            1,623              1,022              1,074              505               590              
Banco do Estado do Espiritu Santo (BANESTES) Brazil 1st Tier 1,161              1,881              282               428                 766                 1,072              72                 118              
Banco do Estado do Santa Catarina (BESC) Brazil 1st Tier 881                 1,211              83                 95                   292                 462                 53                 55                
Banco do Brasilia (BRB) Brazil 1st Tier 764                 967                 437               542                 516                 691                 97                 118              
Banco do Estado Ceará (BEC) Brazil 1st Tier 616                 856                 80                 114                 285                 420                 134               179              
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimiento do Económico e Social (BNDES) Brazil 1st and 2nd Tier 60,992            73,260            21,848          27,785            5,633              9,076              5,318            6,714           
BASA Brazil 1st Tier 1,445              1,897              274               359                 275                 353                 555               697              
Banco del Estado de Chile Chile 1st Tier 15,967            20,558            9,134            11,416            8,859              12,355            763               865              
Banco Agrario de Colombia, S.A. (BANAGRARIO) Colombia 1st Tier 2,550              3,235              708               960                 1,654              2,016              184               232              
Banco de Comercio de Colombia S.A. (BANCOLDEX) Colombia 2nd Tier 1,697              1,613              1,513            1,381              600                 432                 497               528              
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago Costa Rica 1st Tier 462.25            321.55            157.08          176.97            191.54            162.70            29.29            31.43           
Banco de Costa Rica Costa Rica 1st Tier 2,123.23         2,377.38         663.47          871.80            908.54            907.81            225.08           273.68         
Banco Nacional de Costa Rica Costa Rica 1st Tier 3,125.39         3,646.31         1,151.95       1,386.93         1,873.98         2,170.48         214.05           284.62         
Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda Costa Rica 1st Tier 106.16            104.60            23.28            37.48              21.80              26.97              57.76            60.89           
Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal Costa Rica 1st Tier 1,117.38         1,334.45         597.97          708.69            724.53            853.35            226.31           265.61         
Banco de Reservas Dominican Rep. 1st Tier 2,585              2,935              1,522            1,671              1,262              1,610              167               242              
Banco Nacional de la Vivienda Dominican Rep. 1st Tier 213                 197                 61                 58                   1                     1                     158               141              
Corporacion Financiera Nacional Ecuador 2nd Tier 339.62            327.48            86.76            103.06            25.48              179.51           204.08         
Banco Ecuatoriano de la Vivienda Ecuador 2nd Tier 108.95            112.68            30.82            25.62              28.75              35.02              63.19            63.66           
Banco Nacional de Fomento Ecuador 1st Tier 338.56            369.18            175.39          200.70            226.00            258.06            78.35            85.47           
Banco del Estado Ecuador 1st Tier 305.07            403.12            230.62          317.94            20.49              50.01              158.01           171.34         
Banco Hipotecario de El Salvador, S.A. El Salvador 1st Tier 273.93            272.66            136.51          156.15            209.09            201.51            25.81            27.86           
Banco de Fomento Agropecuario El Salvador 1st Tier 145.41            162.17            69.88            64.74              110.34            122.13            17.67            19.38           
El Crédito Hipotecario Nacional de Guatemala Guatemala 1st Tier 324.59 408.73 143.30 138.77 232.37 334.80 44.77 25.23
Banco de Desarrollo Rural Guatemala 1st Tier 1021.02 1367.46 435.72 688.30 881.60 1181.31 50.19 81.33
Régimen de Aportaciones Privadas Honduras 2nd Tier 194.12            227.05            -                -                  -                  -                  73.67            92.14           
Banco Hondureno para la Producción y la Vivienda Honduras 2nd Tier 547.27            537.04            220.71          227.66            -                  -                  198.57           236.50         
Nacional Financiera (Nafin) Mexico 2nd Tier 20,941            21,038            7,057            8,361              8,709              10,250            644               740              
Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior (Bancomext) Mexico 1st Tier 7,603              7,103              4,659            4,808              2,463              3,631              525               533              
Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Publicos (Banobras) Mexico 1st and 2nd Tier 13,211            13,029            5,567            5,185              3,703              4,366              927               1,050           
Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal (SHF) Mexico 2nd Tier 8,024              10,368            7,223            8,769              2,167              2,431              1,110            1,304           
Banco Nacional del Ejercito, Fuerza Aerea y Armada (Banjercito) Mexico 1st and 2nd Tier 1,212              1,303              260               321                 920                 1,020              205               245              
Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros (Bansefi) Mexico 1st and 2nd Tier 761                 900                 0.03              0.03                385                 521                 38                 37                
Financiera Nicaraguense de Inversiones, S.A. Nicaragua 2nd Tier 85.70              96.10              80.71            89.86              -                  -                  58.80            59.87           
Banco Nacional de Panama Panama 1st Tier 3,143              3,656              1,982            1,868              2,480              2,962              500               526              
Caja de Ahorros Panama 1st Tier 1,096              1,114              692               716                 672                 713                 129               139              
Banco Nacional de Fomento Paraguay 1st Tier 233.39            267.86            81.33            84.05              177.48            215.79            18.82            21.02           
Corporacion Financiera de Desarrollo (COFIDE) Peru 2nd Tier 1,119              1,057              351               383                 72                   55                   447               432              
Banco de la Nacion Peru 1st Tier 2,590              3,200              1,545            1,499              1,520              2,053              341               392              
Banco Agropecuario Peru 1st Tier 35                   37                   14                 22                   -                  -                  34                 34                
Banco de la Republica Oriental del Paraguay Uruguay 1st Tier 4,779              5,539              3,686            4,222              4,207              4,627              324               381              
Banco Hipotecario del Uruguay Uruguay 1st Tier 1,296              1,318              611               701                 592                 666                 105               27                
Banco de Fomento Regional Los Andes, C.A. (BANFOANDES) Venezuela 1st Tier 458                 1,553              86                 194                 375                 1,345              52                 164              
Banco Industrial de Venezuela, C.A. Venezuela 1st Tier 1,307              2,316              113               130                 991                 1,850              140               116              
Banco de Comercio Exterior, C.A. (BANCOEX) Venezuela 1st and 2nd Tier 194                 222                 147               85                   -                  -                  187               212              
Instituto Municipal de Crédito Popular (IMCP) Venezuela 1st Tier 26                   29                   8                   7                     23                   27                   2                   1                  
Banco de la Gente Emprendedora (BANGENTE), C.A. Venezuela 1st Tier 17                   30                   12                 25                   4                     10                   4                   4                  
Banco Nacional de Vivienda y Hábitat (BANAVIH) Venezuela 1st and 2nd Tier -                  90                   -                -                  -                  73                   -                24                   
 
Annex 2. DFI Typology 
For purposes of this report, a DFI is a state-owned financial institution with a stated 
policy objective that goes beyond merely acting as a private commercial bank or as the 
government’s financial agent to execute transactions (for example, directly charged to the 
national budget, such as the Financiera Rural—previously Banrural—in Mexico). Thus, 
the DFI is perceived as an instrument that seeks to solve a market failure or simply to 
mitigate poverty, and that it supplies a set of financial services that the private sector is 
underdelivering.  
Therefore, the typology to be proposed herein does not include government-owned 
financial institutions that have been established to either compete with or substitute for 
private institutions. In the past, governments have created this type of bank as an 
extension of the developmental view discussed earlier. The view argued that given the 
paramount role that the financial sector plays in the overall economy, the potential for 
market failures and conflicts of interest is so great that the state should be the provider of 
financial services.
27 
By now, relatively few banks in Latin America belong to this category (for example, 
Banco de Costa Rica), and many of them were private banks that had to be nationalized 
by the government as a result of a financial crisis and thus, are in the process of re-
privatization (for example, until recently, the case of Bancafe in Colombia). 
The proposed typology is based on where DFIs lie along two key dimensions: (a) service 
delivery mechanism and (b) its key strategic driver (that is, whether or not the institutions 
take credit or investment risks and to what degree risks are taken in a sound market 
basis). The former generally refers to whether the DFI services the final beneficiaries 
directly or indirectly (that is, first- or second-tier banking). The latter can serve as a proxy 
on whether the DFI’s role has evolved from the traditional supplier of credit to address a 
perceived marked failure into a more nuanced role seeking to help “markets clear” 
without necessarily providing financial services directly. Thus, this typology defines six 
kinds of DFIs (see Table 1): 
1.  Targeted lender. This category encompasses most of the traditional DFIs that 
direct credit toward specific sectors of the economy or segments of the 
population. Although the number of DFIs in this category tends to decrease, most 
countries have at least one institution in this category, particularly for agricultural 
or rural lending, a segment that remains underserved by private institutions. Two 
other sectors that continue to be served in many countries by such DFIs are low-
income housing and small and medium- sized export-oriented enterprises. In this 
typology, these institutions are the most prone to have key shortcomings 
                                                 
27 This argument has been used even in cases where such market failures or conflicts of interest can not be 
identified ex ante. 
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associated with public financial institutions: (a) generation of market distortions 
by targeting credit to specific sectors at below market interest rates; (b) abuse of 
resources as a consequence of “capture” by the sector or segments of it, thereby 
permitting a high level of nonperforming loans; and (c) misallocation of resources 
and lending that is generally directed to specific interest groups rather than to the 
entire sector that it is supposed to serve. 
2.  Market lender. Some DFIs have evolved to lend on market terms that 
immediately incite the question of why they are engaged in such activity if private 
institutions could lend in those exact terms. In this case, market terms refers to the 
price that private institutions would be charging to loans of similar risks if those 
institutions were to target such customers. The problem is that private institutions 
generally are not targeting them and thus, policy makers have given the DFIs the 
mandate of playing that role by minimizing price distortions. The DFIs are, in 
many cases, addressing lack of physical access. Private banks may be unwilling to 
operate in certain areas, particularly in rural areas with low population density,. 
DFIs of this type, although initially benefiting from government funding to 
expand their networks into those areas, may then lend at the same rates that a 
private bank would lend.  
3.  Direct advisor. Policy makers seeking to promote the growth of certain segments 
of the economy have, in many cases, come to the realization that obtaining credit 
is not necessarily the main constraint faced by individuals. Thus, many targeted 
lenders have migrated to become “financial advisors” that support individuals and 
companies in the process of preparing a business plan, a market promotion, or an 
arrangement of financing from third parties. In this context, for example, many 
export banks are concentrating on promoting industries in foreign markets and 
SME banks are focusing on developing business and financial skills amongst 
enterprise owners. In principle, the lack of lending activities prevents the abuses 
observed on some targeted lender institutions. 
4.  Targeted enabler. These DFIs provide credit lines to first-tier banks at 
subsidized rates to target certain regions or economic activities. The subsidy can 
be given in many ways: for example, the DFI can receive subsidized funding from 
the government and can pass those funds directly to the first-tier bank without a 
risk premium. Alternatively, the DFI could fund itself in the markets, thereby 
taking advantage of its risk backup by the government (that is, its sovereign risk 
quality), and could pass those funds again without a risk premium. 
5.  Liquidity provider. These DFIs provide credit lines to first-tier banks (generally 
private institutions) so that the DFI can address the lack of longer-term funding 
for certain activities (housing mortgages and subnational infrastructure projects 
are two typical areas). Unlike the targeted enablers, liquidity providers seek to 
fund themselves in the markets and pass on those prices to the first-tier bank, with 
a risk markup that incorporates the credit quality of the first-tier institution.  
6.  Markets smoother. These DFIs work with first-tier banks to “help the market 
clear.” This can be achieved through several mechanisms including lowering 
operational costs (for example, providing back-office services to first-tier 
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intermediaries), creating a market place to facilitate more efficient pricing, or 
lowering expected losses by providing partial credit risk guarantees. To the extent 
that they work with private first-tier banks, the liquidity provider and  market 
smoother banks eliminate many of the drawbacks of targeted lenders, provided 
that adequately transparent mechanisms are in place to prevent “capture” of the 
institutions by the first-tier bank. 
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Annex 3. Banadesa’s Accounting System and MIS Deficiencies 
The main deficiencies of the accounting system and the managerial information system 
(MIS) of Banadesa are as follows: 
a.  Banadesa has not audited financial statements for 2003. Thus, those statements were 
not available.   
b.  The auditor signed the 2002 financial statements with remarks, indicating serious 
issues, such as inability of the auditor to verify whether interest charges and large 
value transactions between agencies, branches, and headquarters were correctly 
computed and presented in the financial statements. 
c.  The adjustments made by the external auditor to the 2002 financial statements are 
substantial, and they present Banadesa with a negative net worth, thereby not 
complying with Comisión Nacional de Bancos y Seguros’ (CNBS) capital adequacy 
requirements.  
d.  The nonaudited financial statements of Banadesa for 2003 do not introduce the 
necessary and warranted adjustments made by the external auditor to the 2002 
financial statements. Thus, they provide a distorted financial picture of the financial 
situation.  
e.  In addition to the adjustments of the external auditor, the mission found that loan loss 
provisions are understated, thereby providing unrealistic profitability and equity. The 
reason for this understatement can be explained by the inadequacy of the CNBS 
provisioning requirements with respect to the reality of loan recovery of an 
agricultural DFI like Banadesa. The CNBS provisioning requirements do not call for 
provisioning for loan losses against the “clean,” not yet due, OLP. The largest share 
of the value of Banadesa’s OLP is held in the form of short-term credit, whereby 
interest payment is due only on the date of the loan repayment. However, data 
pertaining to the past performance of Banadesa’s loan collection indicates a very high 
share of arrears from total outstanding loan portfolios that were earlier classified as 
“clean,” not-yet-due loans but that only a few months later became arrears. If 
adjustments are made, the profitability picture presented will become much worse. 
Both the mission and the external auditor agreed on this issue.  
f.  The external auditor audits only the financial statements of Banadesa “proper” and 
two trust funds that were donated by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
and were managed by Banadesa. The different approach toward Banadesa’s own 
sources and the trust funds that Banadesa manages is counter-productive, and it 
hampers transparency.
 28 
g.  The performance of the trust funds is inferior to that of Banadesa’s own funds, as is 
reflected in an even lower loan collection rate. The reason is that operations backed 
by trust funds are subject to frequent political intervention, thereby adversely 
                                                 
28 The president of Banadesa informed the mission that he had begun discussions with the Minister of 
Agriculture, according to the June 20–24, 2004, mission recommendations, about the need and expected 
benefits from consolidating the large number of trust funds and Banadesa’s own funds. 
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affecting financial discipline, narrow direction of credit, and excessive concessionary 
terms that are often motivated by pursuing political support in return to de facto debt 
forgiveness. 
With regard to Banadesa’s deficient financial statements, the main adjustments and 
obstacles to be taken under consideration include the following: 
a.  Substantial adjustments need to be made to remove borrowing from the government 
which was never disbursed, but carried on Banadesa's books per government mandate 
(Decreto Legislativo No.31/92). This debt  requires an offsetting entry that will 
significantly reduce the net worth (equity) of Banadesa. 
b.  Banadesa manages trust funds (Fideicomisos) whose net loan portfolio is as high as 
35 percent of the net loan portfolio of Banadesa’s own funds. Most of the resources of 
the trust funds are provided by the government of Honduras, are not from foreign 
donors, and are effectively internal resources to the degree that most of the funds are 
not required to be repaid. Practically all repayment of subloans that were financed by 
the trust funds are eventually augmenting the net worth (equity) of Banadesa. 
Therefore, there is a need and a rationale to consolidate the financial statements of the 
trust funds into those of Banadesa’s.  However, the trust funds were never audited by 
the external auditor (CNBS provides adjusted accounts for the trust funds for 2002). 
c.  The loan loss provisions of Banadesa, both its own funds and trust funds, are 
underestimated. Three issues should be considered with regard to the 
underestimation. First, the largest share of the value of Banadesa’s OLP is held in the 
form of short-term credit, whereby interest payment is due only on the scheduled 
repayment date. However, data pertaining to the past performance of Banadesa’s loan 
collection indicates a very high share of arrears from a total OLP. Those arrears were 
earlier classified as “clean,” not-yet-due loans that only a few months later became 
arrears. Hence, according to past performance, the coefficients used for provisioning 
for loan losses are inadequate even when they comply with the general CNBC 
provisioning requirements. Second, a loan is classified as nonperforming only when 
all payments are overdue. Third, the Fideicomisos have not been increasing loan loss 
provisions as per CNBC requirements. 
 
 
 
 